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ABSTRACT A variety of different proposals have attempted to explain the apparent
uniqueness of human cumulative culture as a consequence of underlying mechanisms that
are also assumed to be uniquely well-developed in humans. Recently, Heyes and colleagues
have proposed explicit (or Type 2) metacognition as a key feature of human cognition that
might enable cumulative culture. In the current review we examine these arguments, and
consider their plausibility. Firstly we consider whether distinctions between cognitive pro-
cesses described as explicit/implicit, and Type 1/2 (or Systems 1/2), do indeed capture
features that distinguish processes speciﬁc to human cognition, versus those that are shared
with other species. In particular we consider whether this applies to distinctions relating to
metacognitive processes. We also consider the ways in which explicit metacognitive pro-
cessing might plausibly facilitate cumulative culture. We categorise the potential beneﬁts as
either optimising receiver behaviour, or optimising sender behaviour. Within both of these
categories beneﬁts could arise as a consequence of more effective representation of either
one’s own knowledge state, or that of others. We evaluate the current state of evidence
supporting each of these potential beneﬁts. We conclude by proposing methodological
approaches that could be used to directly test the theory, and also identify which (if any) of
the possible causal mechanisms may be implicated.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0200-y OPEN
1 University of Stirling, Stirling, UK. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to J.D. (email: juliet.dunstone1@stir.ac.uk)
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2018) 4:145 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0200-y | www.nature.com/palcomms 1
12
34
56
78
9
0
()
:,;
Introduction
In the current article, we examine the view, recently proposedby Heyes (2016) and Shea et al. (2014), that distinctivelyhuman cultural evolution is attributable to capacities for
explicit (or Type/System 2) metacognition. Essentially, these
accounts argue that an ability to explicitly reﬂect upon states of
knowledge, ignorance, and uncertainty, can fundamentally
change the ways we use and share social information, and that
these particular processes account for the characteristic forward
progress of human culture. In the current review, we aim to
evaluate these accounts, considering the evidence for their
underlying assumptions, as well as the plausibility of mechanistic
routes which could potentially link individual-level cognitive
processes of explicit metacognition, with population-level out-
comes resembling cumulative culture.
Explanations of the distinctiveness of human cumulative
culture
Cumulative cultural evolution is the process by which cultural
traits (including behaviours, artefacts and tools) change over
multiple episodes of social transmission to become more effective
and beneﬁcial to their users (Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018;
Caldwell, 2018). In humans, this can lead to cultural traits evol-
ving over many generations which could not have been invented
by a single individual. Examples of human cumulative culture
span a wide range of domains including abstract conceptual skills
such as the cognitive tools provided by mathematical notation
and operations (e.g. Bender and Beller, 2014), or survival skills
such as lengthy food processing techniques that remove invisible
toxins from raw ingredients (e.g. preparation of cycas seeds, Beck,
1992).
Many species have been shown to exhibit cultural traditions in
the form of behavioural variation between populations which
appears to be maintained by social learning, or evidence of the
social diffusion of particular behavioural variants (Whiten et al.,
2016). To highlight just a few examples, such evidence has been
identiﬁed in chimpanzees (Hobaiter et al., 2014), humpback wales
(Allen et al., 2013), and great tits (Aplin et al., 2015). Therefore,
neither the capacity for culture, nor even the process of cultural
evolution across generations (i.e. in the broader sense of any kind
of incremental change arising as a consequence of social trans-
mission, in the absence of improving functionality), is restricted
to humans. In contrast, the cumulative improvement of traits
across generations (sometimes referred to as the cultural “ratchet
effect”, e.g. (Tomasello, 1990), is widely regarded to be unique to
humans (Dean et al., 2014; Tennie et al., 2009).
Several previous theories have been proposed for why humans
have an apparently unique capacity for cultural ratcheting. The
most prominent view concerns particular learning mechanisms
also proposed to be human unique. Humans are extremely adept
at copying others’ behaviour (e.g. dubbed “Homo imitans” by
Meltzoff, 1988) and seem to have a particular talent (or even a
compulsion in some situations, Heyes, 2011) to do so. Conversely,
non-human animals (henceforth animals) do not seem to exhibit
the same proclivities to anything like the same degree. While
there is evidence for action imitation in some species (e.g. mar-
mosets: Voelkl and Huber, 2000), this occurs at much lower levels
of accuracy, and in far more restricted contexts than in humans
who are highly accurate copiers in domain general contexts. This
has prompted theorists to propose that capacities for imitation
and social learning may have represented critical cognitive
developments in human evolution, allowing for cumulative cul-
ture (Lewis and Laland, 2012; Tomasello, 1999). Converging lines
of evidence from computer models, and tournaments in which
alternative strategies compete in simulated mixed populations
(Rendell et al., 2010) have found that the most successful stra-
tegies involve high rates of copying, and that model populations
predominantly comprising social learners (simulated agents that
“acquire a behavior performed by another individual, whether by
observation of or interaction with that individual” (Rendell et al.,
2010)) are more successful and develop more complex
technologies.
There are however a number of reasons to question the notion
that particular social learning mechanisms may account for
human cumulative culture. Firstly, there is now mounting evi-
dence of imitative abilities in other species (e.g. apes: Whiten
et al., 2004, although see Call et al., 2005 for evidence counter to
these claims) Secondly, in humans, experimental evidence has
shown that cumulative culture can arise even when participants
are restricted from observing others’ actions, such that these
learners are forced to rely on non-imitative processes such as
emulation of end products (Caldwell and Millen 2009). In addi-
tion, although cumulative culture necessarily involves social
transmission as a mechanism for trait heritability, it is important
to note that social learning alone cannot account for the increases
in trait functionality that exemplify the process. The development
of new technologies and behaviours also depends on innovation
(Enquist et al., 2008; Lehmann et al., 2010). While copying error
or accidental discovery, as well as intentional invention, can be
sources of innovations (Caldwell et al., 2016; Henrich et al., 2008),
it is clear that increased abilities for high-ﬁdelity copying alone
cannot explain cumulative increases in cultural behaviours and
artefacts.
These considerations imply that cumulative culture may be
explained not only by the mechanisms available to learners, but
also the contexts in which these are employed, since it is the
selective and strategic use of copying that accounts for its adap-
tiveness; high ﬁdelity copying may be necessary for cumulative
culture to emerge, but it is not sufﬁcient. Indeed, models show
that populations of ﬂexible learners that can switch between social
and individual learning at critical points outperform populations
composed of only social learners, or only individual learners (Ehn
and Laland, 2012; Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2010).
Laland (2004) described a number of potential “Social Learning
Strategies” (SLS) which could reﬂect adaptive rules regarding
when to engage in social learning, and who to learn from. These
included strategies such as: Copy when Uncertain, Copy the
Majority, and Copy Successful Individuals. However, in spite of
the fact that such strategies clearly have some potential to explain
the selective retention of beneﬁcial traits in learner populations,
they nonetheless fail to provide an adequate explanation for the
fact that cumulative culture appears to be restricted to humans.
This is because a wide range of animals have also been shown to
exhibit SLS. This includes social insects (Smolla et al., 2016), ﬁsh
(Pike and Laland 2010) and bats (Jones et al., 2013).
However, Heyes (2018b) has drawn a distinction between
social learning strategies that are based on “planetary” decision
rules with those based on “cook-like” decision rules. Planetary
SLS, like laws of planetary motion, capture regularities within the
observable behaviour of the entities of interest, but the rules are
only in the minds of those doing the describing. In contrast,
“cook-like” SLS are more akin to the decision rules used by a cook
following a recipe, i.e. they are explicitly represented within the
mind of the agent. Heyes (2016, 2018b) has thus argued that it is
these explicitly metacognitive SLS that account for the elaborate
outcomes of human cumulative culture. Although there is no
dissent regarding the fact that animal social learning strategies
demonstrate adaptive ﬂexibility, these “cook-like” SLS are
assumed to permit a much higher degree of—insightful—ﬂex-
ibility, potentially optimising the effectiveness of social
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transmission in a number of different ways (see Section 'How
Might Explicit Metacognition Facilitate Cumulative Culture?').
The proposal that explicit metacognitive processes may set
human social learning apart from that of other animals is com-
pelling, and persuasive theoretical arguments in its favour can be
found in Shea et al., (2014), Heyes (2016), and Heyes (2018b). In
the current review we consider the evidence in support of this
explanation (which we refer to here as the Explicitly Metacog-
nitive Cumulative Culture hypothesis, the EMCC), over and
above competing alternatives. Recent literature (Heyes, 2018a)
elaborates further on this argument to claim that these meta-
cognitive strategies are themselves products of cultural evolution,
as well as processes supporting it. Evaluating this extension of the
theory is beyond the scope of this current review however, and as
such we do not discuss this argument further.
Metacognition and the EMCC as discussed here also encom-
pass capacities for theory of mind, or mentalising. As argued by
Carruthers (2009) metacognition and theory of mind are not
wholly distinct capabilities, and metacognition about one’s own
mind may in fact rely upon prerequisite capacities for mind-
reading about others’ minds. Indeed, some arguments proposing
the utility of explicit metacognitive social learning strategies
encompass mentalising as much as introspection (e.g., Heyes,
2016, when asking “who knows?”), but see section 'Optimisation
of receiver behaviour, due to understanding of others’ knowledge
states' for a more detailed discussion of this not uncontroversial
distinction.
We begin below by examining a key assumption of the EMCC
hypothesis, which is that explicit metacognitive processes are
restricted to humans.
Explicit metacognition as a uniquely human feature
The literature contains numerous claims of metacognitive ability
in animals, across a broad range of species (e.g. monkeys: Smith
et al., 2009; chimpanzees: Beran et al,. 2015; dolphins: Smith et al.,
1995; pigeons: Sole et al., 2003; rats: Foote and Crystal, 2007;
Templer et al., 2017; and even bees: Perry and Barron, 2013).
However, the EMCC rests on the assumption that the experi-
mental paradigms used in these studies are assessing qualitatively
different phenomena from the type of metacognition required for
cumulative culture, which is assumed to be unique to humans. In
this section we examine theories and evidence underlying the
assumption that alternative methodologies in metacognition
research may be evaluating fundamentally different cognitive
processes, and that certain types of metacognition may indeed be
manifested only in humans.
Dual processing theories of cognition. As noted above, a critical
point in the EMCC is that only humans have conscious access to
their social learning decision-making rules, whereas social
learning in other animals is driven by automatic processes of
which the agents themselves are unaware. It is this difference that
is proposed to account for the unusual prevalence of cumulative
culture in humans, compared with other species. It is important
to note that the EMCC does not imply that all human cognition
involves conscious access, or indeed that all examples of social
learning in humans are based on explicit processes. Rather, the
hypothesis draws on theories of human cognition which propose
the existence of two systems, or two processing types. We present
an overview of this body of literature below.
Theories of dual processes for various aspects of cognition have
been relatively widespread since the 1970s (e.g. Wason and Evans,
1974). These theories state that there are two different modes of
higher cognitive processing; one which is generally automatic, fast
acting, non-conscious and based on associative mechanisms, and
one which is conscious, slower to act and rule-based (see Evans
and Stanovich (2013), for a summary of attributes typically
associated with each of the processing types). These two
alternatives are generally referred to as either Systems (Systems
1 and 2), or Process Types (Type 1 and 2), to capture the
automatic (1) and rule-based (2) cases, respectively. Although the
idea of different Process Types offers a less theoretically loaded
framework, which is potentially more consistent with a wider
range of empirical evidence (e.g. reﬂecting a continuum, rather
than a dichotomy, of alternative cognitive mechanisms), it is the
Systems label which has been associated with the idea that there
may be distinctively human modes of cognition ((Epstein, 1994);
(Stanovich, 1999, 2004)). Accordingly, it is the Systems label that
has been used in the literature relating dual process theories to
human cultural evolution (Shea et al., 2014; Heyes, 2016; Heyes,
2018b). In the current review we use both terms.
In relation to the issue of human distinctiveness, some
accounts hold that System 1 is phylogenetically ancient, and
therefore shared with other animals, whereas System 2 is more
recently evolved and likely to be unique to humans. Dual
processing theories have been used as a framework for the
interpretation of a diverse range of psychological phenomena,
from decision making (Evans, 2007), learning (Dienes and
Perner, 1998) and social cognition (Smith and DeCoster, 2000).
Evidence for dual processing comes from dual-task studies, and
tasks which apply strict time pressures. This is because System 2
processes are argued to be taxing on executive functions and
working memory capacity, as well as generally taking longer. Dual
tasks are designed to put an additional load on ﬁnite cognitive
capacities. If two tasks require the same cognitive mechanisms
this creates a bottleneck in processing, resulting in delayed
response or impaired performance in one or both tasks (Pashler,
1994). This means a dual task can detect what level of processing
is being used to complete a task; if task performance is
unimpeded by a concurrent working memory or executive
function load it is likely to be an automatic (or System 1)
process, whereas if working memory load signiﬁcantly reduces
speed or accuracy of responding it is likely to be System 2.
Participants under a working memory load have been found to
make more incorrect responses based on salient information
rather than logical reasoning when completing conjunction
fallacy problems, or logic puzzles such as the Wason Selection
Task (De Neys, 2006). The application of a strict time pressure
may also prevent the use of System 2, as it would not allow the
longer processing time needed. This effect has also been found
using the Wason Selection Task (Roberts and Newton, 2001).
There is also some neurological evidence for dual processing
systems: distinct brain activations for using logic based (System 2)
and belief based (System 1) solutions to problems have been
found using fMRI (Goel and Dolan, 2003). Additionally, NIRS
analysis found that areas implicated in incongruent reasoning
trials were not activated when the same tasks were performed
under additional cognitive load (Tsujii and Watanabe, 2009).
Mcclure et al., (2004) found activation in the prefrontal cortex
during reasoning about future monetary rewards but not during
immediate decision making. This activation was found in a
similar neurological region as areas associated with metacognition
and executive functions.
Dual processing theories are by no means universally accepted;
see Keren and Schul (2009) or Osman (2004) for some objections.
However, critical accounts have generally focused on lack of
precise deﬁnitions, or evidence of overlap between the proposed
dichotomy of characteristics between System 1 and System 2,
concluding that the two systems cannot be considered distinct
and isolable. However, Evans and Stanovich (2013) have argued
that this is merely a poor interpretation of the literature, and that
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most of the features commonly described as differentiating Type
1 and 2 are just correlates typical of the processing types, and that
these should not be expected to operate in a categorical, mutually-
exclusive fashion.
Evans and Stanovich (2013) describe their theory of dual
processing as a “default-interventionist” view (e.g. p227), mean-
ing that the majority of cognition relies on System 1 processes
unless the available response is incorrect or does not meet with
the task goals, in which case System 2 will intervene.
Metacognition and dual process distinctions. It is central to the
EMCC that it is the agents’ conscious access to their decision-
making rules that allows human metacognitive processes to
generate such highly adaptive outcomes from social learning (e.g.
by allowing learners to seek out the most appropriate models
dependent on their speciﬁc goal, Heyes (2018b), or by allowing
those in possession of knowledge to broadcast their degree of
conﬁdence or uncertainty, as well as their choices, Shea et al.,
(2014)). It is perhaps unsurprising then that these theories have
emphasised the importance of the System 1/System 2 distinction.
However, in order to fully understand and evaluate these
accounts, it is important to also consider metacognitive processes
more generally, and then to turn to the question of how these
relate to the dual process framework detailed above.
Metacognition, as originally deﬁned by Flavell (1979), can be
thought of as knowledge about one’s own cognitive processes, or
cognition about cognition. Flavell split this into four separate
components: knowledge (of your own cognitive abilities and of
learning processes), experiences (current feelings of certainty or
doubt), goals (objectives you have in order to achieve your
current cognitive task) and actions (behaviours employed to
achieve these objectives). Subsequent research has instead divided
metacognition into declarative metacognitive knowledge (corre-
sponding to Flavell’s knowledge) and procedural metacognition.
Procedural metacognition has then been commonly divided into
monitoring and control processes (Flavell’s experiences and
actions, respectively) (Roebers, 2017).
The term metacognition therefore encompasses a wide variety
of phenomena. Accordingly, it has been used to describe a broad
spectrum of ﬁndings identiﬁed in a wide range of contexts, from
detecting tiny changes in perceptual stimuli (Deroy et al., 2016) to
deliberately allotting revision time for exams or correcting errors
in a piece of written text (Sannomiya and Ohtani, 2015). In
addition, some authors consider metacognition to encompass
understanding of others’ cognition, as well as one’s own, as part
of a wider cognitive capacity for metarepresentation relating to
mental states (Kuhn, 2000; Misailidi, 2010). In a large proportion
of experimental research, metacognition has typically been
operationalised as judgements of conﬁdence in performance of
an activity just completed (Judgements of Conﬁdence; JOC), or
ratings of prospective performance in an activity about to be
completed (Feeling of Knowing; FOK) (Nelson and Narens, 1990)
Given the speciﬁc emphasis on explicit/System 2 metacognition
within the EMCC, it is worth considering here examples of
metacognitive phenomena which could be classiﬁed as implicit or
System 1 processes, and how these differ from those assumed to
implicate explicit or System 2 processes. Any paradigm involving
direct report of degree of conﬁdence, doubt or uncertainty,
necessarily requires awareness of these states, and therefore would
be classiﬁed as implicating explicit metacognition. However
other, more indirect, methods have also been used as means of
evaluating metacognition, particularly within animal studies.
The typical methodological paradigm used to solicit “meta-
cognitive” behavioural responses in the absence of verbal report,
involves offering an “opt-out” option within a decision making
task, which can be used adaptively by the participant to avoid the
risks associated with particularly difﬁcult trials. Adaptive use of
the option to opt out is assumed to reﬂect the subject’s
appreciation of their own uncertainty, and therefore metacogni-
tion. Such designs have been used to support claims of
metacognitive ability in nonhuman primates (e.g. macaques:
Smith et al., 2008). Alternative methodologies involve ‘informa-
tion-seeking’ paradigms, where a participant can seek additional
information before making a decision, which have also been used
to support claims of metacognitive awareness in primates (e.g.
Call and Carpenter, 2001).
However, these experiments remain contentious as demonstra-
tions of true metacognitive ability, as adaptive performance could
be explained by responses being driven by ﬁrst-order states of
anxiety elicited by the uncertainty of the situation, rather than
second-order reﬂection on the state of uncertainty itself
(Carruthers and Ritchie, 2012). This is explained most thoroughly
by Carruthers (2008), who has argued that ﬁrst-order beliefs,
along with other basic mechanisms such as signal detection
theory, are just as capable of explaining the ﬁndings. The account
can be summarised thus: the participant is presented with two
choices that carry equal valence (the animal is equally motivated
to both choose and not choose either option). As soon as a third
option (the opt-out or uncertain option) is presented this option
automatically becomes the most attractive, especially given its
reinforcement history of being associated with a small reward. As
this explanation is simpler, in terms of the cognition required by
the animal participants, Carruthers argues convincingly that this
is a more parsimonious explanation than those ascribing
metacognitive capacities to animals. A similar account from
Hampton (2009) described how a range of studies claiming to
show animal metacognition could be explained by environmental
or behavioural cues, or direct competition between a choice to act,
or make a “metacognitive” action. These accounts make it clear
that although metacognitive introspection could in principle
explain the results of the studies in question, the plausibility of
such interpretations is seriously challenged by the availability of
simpler explanations. Under the dual process framework, the
animals’ performance in these studies would therefore likely be
classiﬁed as System 1, or implicit, metacognition (e.g. Shea et al.,
2014).
There are unavoidable challenges involved in establishing
whether implicit and explicit metacognitive responses depend on
different cognitive processes, especially if our ultimate motivation
is to determine whether one is a distinctive feature of human
cognition. Adult humans are necessarily capable of both, and we
can only use non-verbal measures with animals due to the
language requirements of direct assessments of explicit metacog-
nition. However, patterns of emergence during human develop-
ment potentially provide another source of evidence that could
shed light on the relationship between implicit and explicit
metacognitive behaviour, and whether implicit adaptive respond-
ing can occur in the absence of explicit competence.
Behavioural tests analogous to the “opt-out” paradigms used
with animals (described above) have been used to demonstrate
implicit metacognitive ability in very young children, from
20 months to around 5 years old. Behavioural tests of
metacognitive competence have also included assessment of
spontaneous information-seeking prior to committing to a
response. These paradigms also potentially provide an insight
into implicit reactions to the state of ignorance, without
necessarily implicating metacognitive awareness of that state.
These studies will not be described in detail here, as reports of
implicit metacognitive measures are not directly relevant to the
current review. However, please see Bernard et al., (2015), Goupil
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et al., (2016) or Call and Carpenter (2001) amongst others for
examples of the paradigms in question.
In spite of the early development of such behavioural responses
to uncertainty (analogous to the evidence from animals), evidence
of explicit metacognitive understanding only appears to emerge
later. Although verbal reports can be readily obtained from
preschool aged children, studies requiring them to verbalise their
own state of knowledge nonetheless indicate that they have
difﬁculty doing this and that when they do they show a pervasive
bias towards overestimation of their own knowledge and
performance (e.g. Rohwer et al., 2012).
The earliest examples of accurate performance based on
explicit measures of metacognition come from children of around
four to ﬁve years old. For example, Rohwer et al., (2012) found
that only children older than ﬁve could provide reports about
what they did not know in a partial exposure task. Cultice et al.,
(1983) also found accurate explicit metacognitive responding in
children aged four and ﬁve years old, asked to name familiar
individuals from their photograph. When children were unable to
spontaneously recall the name themselves, they could respond
with reasonable predictive accuracy to the question: “If I told you
a lot of names, do you think you would know or remember which
one was her name?”.
The adaptive responses to uncertainty identiﬁed in children
younger than four years old (including those aged one and two,
e.g. Goupil et al., 2016, and Call and Carpenter, 2001) appears
strikingly similar to the behaviour of animals in opt-out and
information seeking studies. However, this kind of competence
appears to precede the ability to provide explicit, accurate
evaluations of states of knowledge, which apparently only
develops some years later. This would therefore seem to
corroborate accounts which propose that successful performance
on the alternative task types is underpinned by different
processes, and that the animal studies therefore do not provide
evidence of explicit metacognition. This is consistent with the
EMCC’s assumption that System 2 metacognitive capacities are
speciﬁc to humans.
How might explicit metacognition facilitate cumulative cul-
ture?. As an explanation for distinctively human cumulative
culture, the EMCC rests on two fundamental assumptions. The
ﬁrst of these is the corresponding distinctiveness of explicit
metacognition (as examined in the preceding section). The sec-
ond of these is that the resulting reﬂective awareness of states of
knowledge, ignorance and uncertainty (identiﬁed as the deﬁning
feature of explicit metacognition) offers signiﬁcant beneﬁts with
regard to the optimisation of social information use, in ways that
could explain the ratchet-like advances which distinguish human
culture from the traditions of other species. Having considered
the ﬁrst of these premises in the preceding sections, we now turn
to the second. What basis is there, either evidential or logical, for
believing that explicit metacognition might enable cumulative
culture? What are the potential routes by which this might occur?
We hope that by clarifying the potential links between explicit
metacognition and cumulative culture we can identify areas
where evidence is lacking, with a view to informing future
research efforts investigating the EMCC.
Explicit metacognition could potentially enable cumulative
culture in a number of different ways. Below, we categorise the
potential beneﬁts as arising from receiver behaviour, or sender
behaviour. Within both of these categories beneﬁts could arise as
a consequence of more effective representation of one’s own
knowledge state, or that of others. It should be noted at this point
that the existing accounts of the EMCC focus, respectively, on
optimisation of sender behaviour due to understanding of own
knowledge state (Shea et al., 2014) and optimisation of receiver
behaviour due to understanding of others’ knowledge states
(Heyes, 2016), both detailed below.
Optimisation of receiver behaviour, due to understanding of own
knowledge state. In much the same way that metacognitive
awareness is assumed to facilitate academic performance (Dun-
losky and Metcalfe, 2009) it is possible that it could similarly
enable cumulative culture for reasons that are not inherently
linked to how an agent understands or interacts with others.
Awareness of one’s own knowledge state would allow learners to
seek out new information when necessary, and recognise when
updating their knowledge might be beneﬁcial. This awareness
might also be crucial when acquiring a new skill or knowledge is
likely to require a protracted period of effortful practice before
mastery is achieved. Essentially, we would predict that such
awareness would result in social information being used in a
much more optimal fashion than would otherwise be possible,
encouraging highly strategic social information seeking, as well as
direction of effort towards innovation when social information
sources are judged to be inadequate. To our knowledge, the role
of this kind of reﬂective awareness in directing one’s own learning
has not been investigated within the social learning and cultural
evolution literature. However, some authors have alluded more
tangentially to the importance of self-focussed strategic effort in
social learning. For example, Galef (2013) has stated: “in the case
of skiing, there is no learning to do an act from seeing it done.
Rather, there is learning by observation that an act is possible….
[A] novice can … select from within her available repertoire of
movements…. Then, over time, she can bring that ﬁrst approx-
imation into greater accord with the demonstrated act.” (p. 125).
Galef (2013) also suggests that such learning may be particularly
important for cumulative culture.
As noted above, this would be a route by which explicit
metacognition might be critical to generating cumulative culture
without the effects being restricted to social learning speciﬁcally.
In the accounts of both Shea et al., (2014) and Heyes (2016),
explicit metacognition is assumed to facilitate cumulative culture
because it helps agents make inferences about others’ knowledge
(Heyes, 2016) or provide information to others (Shea et al., 2014).
It is perhaps not surprising that, in attempting to explain a
phenomenon which itself certainly does depend on social
learning, authors have focused on explanations which would
speciﬁcally facilitate that type of learning over and above others.
However, we would suggest that explicit metacognition might
potentially facilitate efﬁcient use of any kind of vicariously
acquired information, as well as helping in any situation where
habitual or automatic responses may need to be overridden due
to the availability of up-to-date, or situation-speciﬁc, information
which indicates that these are not appropriate. This account
would be consistent with the assumptions of the “default
interventionist” views of dual-process cognition described earlier,
which posit that System 2 intervenes only when automatic System
1 processes are inadequate for the task in question. Thus, explicit
decision rules, reasoning processes and learning strategies are
likely to be intrinsically associated with situations where default
responses (based on personal reinforcement history and/or
genetically inherited behavioural biases) will be ineffective.
Although such situations will be by no means restricted to
contexts involving social information use, the need to override
default automatic and habitual responses may be a prevalent
feature of these contexts. Consider a situation in which a new
possibility becomes apparent to an agent through vicarious
exposure to another’s behaviour; for example, the agent might
observe that plentiful food resources, such as tubers, could be
found underground. Taking full advantage of this new
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information might necessitate an immediate switch in foraging
strategy, overriding habitual responses which have been directly
reinforced on multiple occasions. Although similar exposure to
new information might occur outside of social contexts (e.g., if
tubers were to be revealed as an incidental outcome of
disturbance of the ground surface), the behaviour of others is
perhaps particularly likely to provide information of immediate
utility. Furthermore, once transgenerational accumulation of
knowledge was in evidence, social sources would then effectively
become repositories of particularly valuable information that
might be otherwise hard to acquire. Therefore the beneﬁts of this
type of learning might be most apparent in social contexts, even
though the learning mechanisms themselves would be general-
purpose ones, not speciﬁcally adapted for use in social contexts.
Essentially, the suggestion here is that System 2 metacognition
may be critical due to the high “executive function” demands of
the type of social learning likely to be involved in cumulative
culture. Overlap between the concepts of executive function and
metacognition have been acknowledged in the existing literature
(e.g. Roebers, 2017). Indeed, some research effort has already
been targeted at the question of whether executive function
limitations (speciﬁcally difﬁculties with inhibition) might explain
the absence of cumulative culture in chimpanzees (e.g. Davis
et al., 2016). We would see such an explanation as falling under
the umbrella of the broader EMCC, within this particular
category of optimisation of receiver behaviour due to under-
standing of own knowledge state.
Optimisation of sender behaviour, due to understanding of own
knowledge state. Understanding of one’s own state of knowledge
can also potentially facilitate cumulative culture by inﬂuencing
sender behaviour, increasing the likely beneﬁt to others of oneself
as a source of social information. Access to one’s own level of
conﬁdence or uncertainty means that this information can be
conveyed to others, alongside actual behavioural decisions. This
would then allow others to make more strategic use of that social
information, weighting information more heavily when a source
reports conﬁdence, or disregarding conﬂicting information when
a source reports high levels of uncertainty. It is this aspect of the
EMCC that forms the focus of Shea et al.’s, (2014) argument.
There is some experimental evidence suggesting that this kind of
metacognitive communication does indeed improve the efﬁcacy
of social information use. For example Bahrami et al., (2010)
studied pairs of participants completing a low-level perceptual
decision-making task. When members of a pair had similar visual
acuity, they performed better as a pair than they did individually,
as long as they were given the opportunity to communicate freely.
The authors concluded that this beneﬁt was attributable to the
participants providing accurate estimates of their own conﬁdence
level within their communication.
Optimisation of receiver behaviour, due to understanding of others’
knowledge states. Although there is still considerable debate over
whether metacognition relating to one’s own mind involves the
same processes as metacognition regarding the mind of others
(e.g. see Carruthers, 2009), when it comes to explicit metacogni-
tion, it certainly seems likely that understanding one’s own mind,
and understanding those of others, are likely to be linked, given
the degree of reﬂective awareness involved (even if the speciﬁcs of
which understanding comes ﬁrst may be unclear; see the various
models outlined in Carruthers, 2009). Nonetheless, it is worth
noting that arguments in support of the EMCC that place the
emphasis on explicit understanding of other’s minds (e.g. Heyes,
2016), are using the term metacognition in a context that, in other
areas of the literature, would be regarded as non-standard, and
possibly even controversial (e.g. Nichols and Stich, 2003).
Furthermore, the literature previously discussed in this review,
which relates to the question of whether particular types of
metacognition may be unique to humans, may not be strictly
relevant in addressing this particular interpretation of the EMCC,
since an ability to evaluate one’s own conﬁdence or uncertainty
may or may not predict one’s understanding of others as mental
agents. However, if anything, it is probably much easier to make
an argument that an explicit understanding of others’ minds is
restricted to humans. “Theory of mind” (e.g. Premack and
Woodruff, 1978), has been a focus of much empirical enquiry and
many theoretical analyses in both comparative and develop-
mental psychology, and therefore we do not intend to reiterate
ﬁndings or conclusions in depth here. But a number of accounts
have proposed separate systems for mindreading as a means to
reconcile behavioural ﬁndings suggesting some tracking of other’s
mental states in toddlers and animals (e.g. Krupenye et al., 2016;
Southgate et al., 2007), with consistent evidence that explicit
understanding of others’ beliefs does not develop until around the
age of four in children (e.g. Wellman et al., 2001), as well as the
failure of nonhuman apes in an equivalent nonverbal analogue
task (Call and Tomasello, 1999). Apperly and Butterﬁll’s (e.g.
Apperly and Butterﬁll, 2009) two-systems account is perhaps the
most high proﬁle of the theories that have been proposed to
reconcile these ﬁndings (although others exist, e.g. Perner and
Roessler, 2012). However, here it sufﬁces to note that it is a
relatively widespread view that implicit and explicit tests of
understanding of others’ mental states may be measuring differ-
ent processes.
It follows fairly logically, then, to conclude that a System 2, or
explicit, understanding of others’ mental states might give an
agent a signiﬁcant advantage in their use of social information,
allowing them to use this more ﬂexibly and in accordance with
the most up-to-date information about who is likely to be an
effective model (in line with Heyes’s distinction between cook-
like and planetary-like decision rules). However, in spite of the
convincing rationale for this potential advantage, to our knowl-
edge no empirical studies to date have tested whether an explicit
understanding of social sources as mental agents confers beneﬁts
over and above implicitly represented strategies. For example, it
might be expected that with advancing age, children become
capable of using social information in increasingly sophisticated
ways, perhaps overriding general purpose biases and heuristics
when new information about others’ actual knowledge comes to
light. For example, recognising that the actions of a single
knowledgeable individual are likely to be more valuable than the
same number of actions from multiple uniformed individuals. In
the absence of such evidence, this particular assumption of how
the EMCC might operate may well be plausible, but it nonetheless
remains highly speculative.
Optimisation of sender behaviour, due to understanding of others’
knowledge states. Explicit understanding of others’ mental states
might also bring about changes in sender behaviour, as well as
that of the receiver. Even in animals, social learning is not
necessarily restricted to the use of inadvertent cues acquired from
others as a consequence of incidental observation of behaviours
performed only in the interests of the actor themselves. Therefore
senders can play an active role in social transmission, and the
ﬁner details of how they do so may be signiﬁcant. In animals,
behaviour that functions to teach others has been documented in
a number of different species (e.g. meerkats: Thornton and
McAuliffe, 2006; ants: Franks and Richardson, 2006). However, as
with animals’ social learning “strategies”, this is a further example
where the adaptive function of the behaviour is assumed not to be
driven by the agent’s understanding of that function. This is
therefore very different from teaching as it would normally be
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interpreted in humans, which would generally be expected to
implicate some degree of recognition of the part of the teacher,
regarding the potential effect of the behaviour on another’s
knowledge or skill level. The question pertinent to the EMCC
then, is whether sender behaviour can facilitate the learning of
others much more effectively when senders have an under-
standing of others’ states of knowledge or ignorance. As with the
mechanism described in the previous section, a logical argument
for this can be constructed with very little difﬁculty. At the very
least, such an understanding would open out the potential con-
texts within which teaching could occur, whereas (to extend the
analogy) “planetary” teaching behaviour would be expected to be
restricted to contexts involving an extended selection history
(including species-typical behaviours, such as particular predation
skills as in meerkats, or well-deﬁned categories of episodic
knowledge, such as routes to food sources as in ants). Caldwell
et al., (2017) have previously argued that intentional teaching
may be particularly valuable for supporting cumulative culture,
since almost by deﬁnition cumulative culture is likely to involve
novel behavioural variants that are not part of the species-typical
repertoire.
In addition to broadening the contexts across which teaching
can occur, an understanding of others’ minds may also render
teaching behaviour far more effective, due to the ability to gauge
one’s own behaviour in response to the apparent needs of the
learner. Teachers can selectively show or perform particular
features of what is to be transmitted, with a view to making this
maximally informative, based on their own understanding of
what might beneﬁt a learner. Furthermore, an understanding of
the mind of the learner also allows for adjustments to be made
online during teaching, in direct response to the learner’s level of
success. Mistakes can be corrected, or misunderstandings
clariﬁed, and redundancy can be avoided by skipping elements
already mastered. A similarly high level of responsiveness might
be unlikely in the absence of sensitivity to the meaning of
potential cues to knowledge and competence.
There is some literature documenting developmental changes
in teaching behaviour in young children which appears consistent
with this. Ronfard and Corriveau (2016) studied how children
aged between three and ﬁve years old taught a game to puppet
characters that had demonstrated differing levels of competence.
They found that children’s ability to monitor the relative accuracy
of the puppets improved with age, and that older children tailored
their instruction more precisely to the apparent needs of the
learner, more often directly addressing the speciﬁc errors of
individual puppets. This ﬁnding is consistent with the assumption
that increasing awareness of others’ mental states can facilitate
transmission by altering sender behaviour.
Optimisation of the sender-receiver interaction due to under-
standing of minds of self and other. It should be noted that the
above categorisations are not intended to be regarded as mutually
exclusive; indeed it would be surprising in some cases if they
operated in complete isolation from one another. In addition, for
each of these two categorisations, it might be expected that
beneﬁts arising from the interaction between the two alternative
mechanisms could be more than the sum of their individual parts
(i.e. the combination of smart behaviour on the part of both
sender and receiver, or the combination of understanding of one’s
own knowledge in relation to others’, might be particularly
effective in generating cumulative culture). For example, an
interaction between an experienced individual (who is motivated
to impart their knowledge) and a naïve partner (who is motivated
to learn), will likely be most effective when each recognises the
other’s motivation. In the categorisations detailed above we have
only discussed communication in the context of sender
behaviour, but communication on the part of the receiver may
also have a powerful role to play once there is a mutual appre-
ciation of a shared motivation. This allows the receiver to effec-
tively communicate what the sender may need to know, in order
to provide the most effective guidance. Clearly, such bidirectional
cooperative interactions involve high levels of ﬂexibility in the
behaviour of both the sender and receiver, informed by their
understanding of both their own, and their partner’s, state of
knowledge. For the receiver to effectively communicate their
needs, this is likely to include not just a representation of the
sender’s mental state, but a representation of the sender’s repre-
sentation of the receiver’s mental state (second order theory of
mind, e.g., Perner and Wimmer, 1985), which they are in a
position to correct, update, or augment.
In such contexts the breakdown of roles into “sender” and
“receiver” becomes signiﬁcantly less clear-cut. Consistent with
this, it has been shown that both members of a pair can improve
their performance on certain tasks through two-way information
sharing (Bahrami et al., 2010). Bahrami et al., found that such
beneﬁts only occurred when participants were able to commu-
nicate freely, and thus share their conﬁdence levels in addition to
their own initial best guess, consistent with the idea that these
beneﬁts arise due to metacognitive competence relating to both
communicating one’s own level of knowledge, and the inter-
pretation of others’. There may be particular value in being able
to interpret another’s knowledge state relative to one’s own, in
ways that make each interacting agent simultaneously both a
provider of social information (through their inﬂuence on
another’s success level), and also a beneﬁciary (through their
own improved performance).
It needs to be acknowledged that metacognition is not
infallible; people are often under- or over-conﬁdent when rating
their performance (for example see Metcalfe and Dunlosky, 2008;
Miller and Geraci, 2011). However, this shortcoming in self-
regulation may be overcome by the shared nature of explicit
metacognition: Bang et al., (2017) found a collective beneﬁt in
making collective perceptual judgements when ‘poorly calibrated’
groups of participants (groups where the more conﬁdent
members were not the more accurate or skilled members)
matched their conﬁdence levels. This may suggest that explicitly
sharing metacognitive information about conﬁdence, such as in
the scenarios described by Shea et al., (2014), would help to
counteract negative effects of poor metacognitive accuracy on
personal decision making.
How can the EMCC be tested?. Currently, evidence for the EMCC
remains very limited. The accounts proposed by Shea et al.,
(2014) and Heyes (2016) are built on indirect inference, drawing
links between apparent differences in metacognitive awareness in
humans versus animals, and the plausibility of metacognition
facilitating cumulative culture (sometimes supported by evidence
suggesting that outcomes of social learning may be inﬂuenced by
the availability of metacognitive information). However, in order
to effectively evaluate these proposals, more direct evidence is
now required. Firstly, there is a need for further empirical evi-
dence that experimentally manipulates the availability of meta-
cognitive resources and/or information, in order to look for direct
impact on outcomes of social learning. Secondly, there is a need
for studies that fully operationalise cumulative culture, as
opposed to studying single transmission events, or looking at
interactions only at the level of the dyad. We would expect the
combination of these methods to elicit results that showed a
reduction in ratchet-like behaviour over generations. That is,
methods that are shown to produce accumulation of improve-
ment over generations under normal conditions would no longer
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show this accumulation when those tasks are carried out in
conditions that prevent access to or use of system-2.
Identifying empirical evidence of a causal link between explicit
metacognition and cumulative culture is critical in order to
establish that the EMCC has some explanatory power over and
above other speculative explanations of cumulative culture in
terms of other apparently uniquely human features. There are a
multitude of features that differentiate humans from other
animals, and it is often not difﬁcult to make an argument for
the involvement of a particular cognitive or behavioural trait in
cumulative culture. What will distinguish such proposals is the
availability of empirical evidence that convincingly demonstrates
a causal link between the feature or trait in question and
outcomes of social learning.
Brain imaging techniques may be used to identify if there are
correlations between brain regions activated when using adaptive
social learning strategies and capacities for cumulative culture,
and those activated when making explicit metacognitive judge-
ments; the EMCC would predict strong correlations in these
areas. However, this would not provide direct evidence of a causal
link between explicit metacognition and cumulative culture.
Studies which experimentally manipulate the availability of
metacognitive resources or information are therefore required to
test the EMCC. This is likely to be considerably easier to do for
studies investigating the effects of sender behaviour, compared
with those focusing on the abilities of the receiver. Accordingly,
studies already exist (e.g., Bahrami et al., 2010, described
previously) which have experimentally manipulated opportunities
for communication, and therefore the potential for sharing
metacognitive information, which demonstrate positive impacts
on the effectiveness of social information. However, it is much
harder to manipulate the extent to which a receiver can employ
explicit metacognition in their interpretation of others’ behaviour,
since it is not possible to simply remove human capacities for
metacognition. Nonetheless, we can envisage at least two
potentially fruitful avenues of investigation which would allow
some insight into the effects of the availability of metacognitive
resources on the part of the receiver. The ﬁrst of these would
involve the use of dual task methods, described previously. The
EMCC speciﬁcally implicates System 2 involvement, and it should
be possible to block or impede the involvement of System 2 using
dual tasks that also place demands on executive function. This
could therefore act as a proxy for restricting explicit metacogni-
tion directly, with the expectation that reduced access to explicit
processing would restrict participants’ ability to interpret (and
also share) social information in ways that could be critical for
generating cumulative culture.
The expected outcomes of such tasks would be a reduced
capacity to make the requisite social learning decisions required
for cumulative culture to emerge, and therefore a reduction or
absence of ratcheting in tasks that would ordinarily have been
shown to produce a ratchet effect in the laboratory.
A further promising approach would be to investigate the
effects of developmental changes in metacognitive competence on
performance in social learning paradigms, by studying both in
young children of a range of ages. The EMCC predicts strong
correlations between the emergence of explicit metacognitive
competence, executive function capacities and proﬁciency in
strategic social learning tasks.
It should be noted however, that none of the approaches
discussed would allow direct manipulation of the involvement of
explicit metacognition. Whilst dual task methods offer potential
for experimental manipulation, this would be premised on an
assumption that these functioned to block explicit metacognition.
Interpretation of such results would therefore be strengthened
considerably by the existence of additional evidence validating
this assumption, which to our knowledge has yet to be tested. We
know of no studies to date which have investigated the
involvement of System 2 processing (i.e., as assessed through
evidence of interference under dual task conditions) in explicit
reports of metacognition such as judgements of conﬁdence and
feelings of knowing (JOC and FOK). Such tests would provide key
evidence in evaluating the EMCC, which would inform both
theory and method.
Neuroimaging approaches are also somewhat limited in their
scope as although they may demonstrate the involvement of brain
areas associated with explicit metacognition, they are not
necessarily able to show whether participants are unable to
produce ratcheting effects in cultural evolution tasks without the
involvement of these areas.
Evidence from developmental approaches, whilst offering
insights into the potential for cumulative culture both before
and after the development of explicit metacognition, would be
necessarily pseudo-experimental, involving no attempt to experi-
mentally manipulate the variable of interest, making it much
more difﬁcult to identify a causal association. Nonetheless, if
relationships were to be found between individual-level measures
of metacognitive ability, and individual-level measures of social
learning proﬁciency, especially if these persisted when controlling
for age, this would provide fairly convincing support for the
EMCC. Certainly, in spite of their respective limitations, both
dual task and developmental approaches, and to some extent
neuroimaging approaches, have the potential to provide much
stronger support than circumstantial evidence of common
exclusivity to humans.
In addition, we would also suggest that a truly robust test of the
EMCC would involve laboratory simulation of cumulative culture
(e.g. Caldwell and Millen, 2008, 2009), rather than the study of
single transmission events, or dyadic interactions. If ultimately
the EMCC aims to explain the (group-level) phenomenon of
human cumulative culture, it is critical to show that the
involvement or otherwise of explicit metacognition does actually
impact on the degree to which learning beneﬁts accrue over
multiple generations (e.g. Caldwell, 2018). Thus, experimental
designs using transmission chain or microsociety paradigms (e.g.
Mesoudi and Whiten, 2008) would provide a key source of
evidence in evaluating the EMCC.
Finally, we also propose that research should be targeted at
identifying which of the routes described in Section 'How Might
Explicit Metacognition Facilitate Cumulative Culture?' account
for any link found between explicit metacognition and cumulative
culture. We have argued that in principle all are plausible.
However, a full account would specify which of these (whether in
isolation or combination) appeared to be critical to supporting
ratchet effects in cultural evolution.
Conclusion
To date, there is as yet no generally accepted theory explaining
the apparent uniqueness of human cumulative culture. The the-
ories recently proposed by Heyes (2016, 2018b) and Shea et al.,
(2014), which implicate the use of explicit metacognition and
System 2 cognition (or Type 2 processes) have the potential to
provide a convincing account of distinctively human culture.
Here we have used the term the Explicitly Metacognitive
Cumulative Culture hypothesis (EMCC), to refer to any view
proposing that System 2 processes allow human learners to use
metacognition in ways that facilitate social learning. We have also
proposed a number of different routes by which System 2
metacognition might have potential to enable cumulative culture,
through optimising the behaviour of either the sender or receiver
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behaviour, based on an explicit understanding of the mental
states of either oneself or others.
We have established that, to date, there has been little or no
empirical work directly testing these proposals. Indirect evidence
is available which provides some support for the view that the
implicit metacognitive competence identiﬁed in animals depends
on processes distinct from explicit metacognition. There is also
some support for the view that information transmission may
become more effective with increasing metacognitive competence
(at least on the part of the sender), and that having the oppor-
tunity to communicate metacognitive conﬁdence levels, in addi-
tion to task responses themselves, can also increase beneﬁts of
social learning. However, there are signiﬁcant gaps in the litera-
ture, particularly from the point of view of establishing the
mechanistic links (see section 'How Might Explicit Metacognition
Facilitate Cumulative Culture?') between apparently distinctively
human explicit metacognition, and the evolutionary anomaly of
cumulative culture. In particular, we see a need for studies
involving laboratory tasks which operationalise the group-level
phenomenon of cumulative culture, rather than focussing on
single transmission events. We have also highlighted that dual
task methods, understood to restrict the use of System 2, have not
as yet been exploited within the literature on social learning and
cultural evolution, and that these offer a potentially powerful tool
for experimentally manipulating the availability of cognitive
resources needed for explicit metacognitive processing. We have
further suggested that developmental research in human children
could shed valuable light on this topic, as children’s advancing
metacognitive competence offers a natural experiment permitting
investigation of the resulting effects on the efﬁcacy of social
learning, through increasingly ﬂexible and sophisticated beha-
viour (whether in the role of sender or receiver).
In conclusion therefore, we consider that the EMCC has con-
siderable promise as a potential explanation for the elaborateness
of human culture in relation to the behavioural traditions of other
animals. Further research is now warranted in order to test key
assumptions and ﬂesh out the details of the links.
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